Abstract

As a security researcher in my free time I spend my time on both application and web application security. During one of my researches while I was focusing on auditing JavaScript codes I spent some time on Alexa top ranks and their JS libraries to see what I can find in theme. So I started working on apple, FaceBook, Yahoo! I just surprised I found few issues on all of them! And in this article I want to explain one of my cool findings on Yahoo! Mail which can be used to completely compromise an account.

According to Wikipedia[1], Yahoo mail has around 310 million users in October 2011 so any serious vulnerabilities puts millions of users in risk. Finding XSS in Yahoo! is not a new thing and is not that so hard. Reason of creating this article is not just proofing Yahoo! is vulnerable and it’s about how easy is to find and exploit vulnerabilities in well-known websites.

So in this short paper we will review on 5 steps.

• Introduction
• Step I   : Steps to finding vulnerability
• Step II  : Triggering and analyzing the vulnerability
• Step III : Exploiting the vulnerability
• Step IV : Hijacking user accounts
• Step V  :  Patching the vulnerability
• Yahoo incomplete patch
• Appendix : Demo
• Appendix II  : Dominator to rescue
• Credits / References

Paper Download link

http://abysssec.com/files/Yahoo!_DOMSDAY.pdf

http://www.exploit-db.com/wp-content/themes/exploit/docs/24109.pdf

 

PoC Demo

 

you can watch demo here :

also you can download it from here

update : youtube removed video after ~30K  viewers and i don’t know why …

press links :

http://thenextweb.com http://threatpost.com/ http://news.softpedia.com/ http://www.computerworld.com/ http://news.hitb.org/ http://thenextweb.com/ http://www.offensive-security.com/ http://www.scmagazine.com/ http://www.ehackingnews.com/ http://allthingsd.com/ http://www.securityweek.com/ http://www.isssource.com/

 

i know it’s too late but happy new years !

---

hello all

it’s been a while after writing a post and you may know Abysssec  mostly write about application security but we are working on web apps too . in this post we are gonna talk about funny case of wordpress exploitation using ClickJacking technology. as you may know Wordpress Admin panel has x-frame-option which prevent clickjacking but in main page of blog no x-frame-option has been set, so it possible to trick him and make him to post a comment, using Clickjacking. As you may know admin can post comment with html and it is obvious by default this isn’t dangerous, But as blog main page has no x-frame-option it is possible to make XSS of it and finally you can mix ClickJacking /XSS / HTTPOnly Disclosure to make a working exploit.

here is video of  PoC sorry for hosting we have some issue we will upload on abysssec soon  :

http://abysssec.com/files/WordPress_ClickJack.rar

WordPress is aware of unfiltered html with superadmin user but as you can see it’s still possible to exploit the issue .

we reported this so called issue to wordpress ~2 month ago

the answer we got is :

5/4/2012:

Thank you for the report. We're looking into this and will get back to you soon.

5/16/2012:

Sorry for the delayed reply. We've been discussing how best to do this without inconveniencing users.  At the moment we're considering adding the unfiltered_html nonce via JS when the page is not framed. I'll hopefully have a patch to share soon.

Thanks all

happy blogging !

Abysssec Research

we tried for other case in exploit bounty this time for a 500$ one .

no luck for successful exploitation and to be honest we didn’t tried so hard . at least we got a PoC and here is our analysis for this cool bug.

1) Advisory information

 

Title                   :  GDI+ CreateDashedPath Integer overflow in gdiplus.dll

  Discovery         :  Nicolas july from vupen

  Analysis            :  Abysssec.com

  Vendor             :  http://www.microsoft.com

  Impact              :  High

  Contact            :  info  [at] abysssec.com

  Twitter             : @abysssec

  CVE                   : CVE-2011-0041

2) Vulnerable version

Gdiplus.dll 5.2.6001.22319

 

3) Vulnerability information

 

Class

        1-Integer overflow

Impact

Successfully exploiting this issue allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code in the context of vulnerable application or cause denial-of-service conditions.

Remotely Exploitable

Yes

Locally Exploitable

Yes

4) Vulnerabilities detail

 

The vulnerability exists in gdiplus!GpPath::CreateDashedPath function of gdiplus.dll that is responsible for bitmap drawing and other 2d graphic rendering. EMF+ file is one of the image file format that is rendered by the library. And the vulnerability is based on some floating point calculation of an EMF+ path object.

We made the following proof of concept to trigger the issues and it will be explained more:

 

A little taste of file format we simply put a EMF_COMMENT record (id = 0×00000046) and embed and emf+ geraphic object ( id = 0×00004008 ) . For simplicity we ripped out a valid graphic object from another file and started to play with it. The record have two important area that we highlighted them in the above picture.

 

Here is the faulty code:

.text:4ECFCBAD loc_4ECFCBAD:

.text:4ECFCBAD                 mov     eax, esi

.text:4ECFCBAF                 shl     eax, 3

.text:4ECFCBB2                 cmp     [ebp+lpMem], 0

.text:4ECFCBB6                 push    eax             ; dwBytes

.text:4ECFCBB7                 jz      short loc_4ECFCBCE

.text:4ECFCBB9                 push    [ebp+lpMem]     ; lpMem

.text:4ECFCBBC                 call    GpRealloc(x,x)

.text:4ECFCBC1                 test    eax, eax

.text:4ECFCBC3                 jz      loc_4ECFCCDB

.text:4ECFCBC9                 mov     [ebp+lpMem], eax

.text:4ECFCBCC                 jmp     short loc_4ECFCBDE

.text:4ECFCBCE ; —————————————————————————

.text:4ECFCBCE

.text:4ECFCBCE loc_4ECFCBCE:                      

.text:4ECFCBCE                 call    GpMalloc(x)

.text:4ECFCBD3                 test    eax, eax

.text:4ECFCBD5                 mov     [ebp+lpMem], eax

.text:4ECFCBD8                 jz      loc_4ECFCCDB

 

The above code uses the eax register as arguments to the GpMalloc function. GpMalloc is simply a gdi version of heapAlloc function. The value of eax register is based on various floating point calculation that is not simple to examine at first look.

But I traced the value of eax register and it seems the calculations are based on our values mentioned earlear in the file.  And it doesn’t bound checked well, by changing the path value tricky it is possible when the “shl    eax, 3” instruction multiply the value by 8 we get an integer overflow and in turn a faulty heap allocation.

 

I dynamically traced the values with my proof of concept file. Eax register is equall to eax + [ebp-38] * 10 and as there are a lot of values and calculations before that, for better consideration I made the following diagram:

 

 

 

 

It took a lot of time explanation of all of the variables above but, the important one is the GpPath object that is in the code a clone of the object is made to later be manipulated for drawings.

.text:4ECFC9D9 loc_4ECFC9D9:                           ; CODE XREF: GpPath::CreateDashedPath(DpPen const *,GpMatrix const *,float,float,float,int)+1AAj

.text:4ECFC9D9                 fld     dword ptr [esi+eax*4]

.text:4ECFC9DC                 fmul    [ebp+arg_0]

.text:4ECFC9DF                 fstp    dword ptr [esi+eax*4]

.text:4ECFC9E2                 inc     eax

.text:4ECFC9E3                 cmp     eax, [ebp+arg_4]

.text:4ECFC9E6                 jl      short loc_4ECFC9D9

.text:4ECFC9E8

.text:4ECFC9E8 loc_4ECFC9E8:                      

.text:4ECFC9E8                 mov     ecx, [ebp+var_18] ; Src

.text:4ECFC9EB                 call    GpPath::Clone(void)

.text:4ECFC9F0                 mov     edi, eax

.text:4ECFC9F2                 test    edi, edi

.text:4ECFC9F4                 jz      loc_4ECFCDBA

.text:4ECFC9FA                 mov     eax, [edi]

.text:4ECFC9FC                 mov     ecx, edi

.text:4ECFC9FE                 call    dword ptr [eax+4]

 

After calling the clone, it checks whether it is a valid clone or not at address 4ECFC9FE.

The offset +34h of the object contains a pointer to our 4byte path object values.

0:000> dd ecx

0e03ca50  4ec67e58 68745031 00000000 00000000

0e03ca60  0e03ca74 0e03ca74 00000010 00000010

0e03ca70  00000002 00000100 00000000 00000000

0e03ca80  00000000 0e03ca98 0e03ca98 00000010

0e03ca90  00000010 00000002 449a8eab 458ac500

0e03caa0  449a8eab 4e0000fe 00000000 00000000

0e03cab0  00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000

0e03cac0  00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000

 

Our floating point values in the file format:

0e03ca98  449a8eab 458ac500 449a8eab 4e0000fe

0e03caa8  00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000

 

But there are some modifications on our values before we get the faulty code. First after the clone is performed GpPath::Flatten function made some changes to our values based on a transform matrix in the file. So this is cause of the highlighted 6 DWORDs in the file.­­­

.text:4ECFC9FE                 call    dword ptr [eax+4]

.text:4ECFCA01                 test    eax, eax

.text:4ECFCA03                 jz      loc_4ECFCDBA

.text:4ECFCA09                 fld     ds:flt_4ECB80FC

.text:4ECFCA0F                 push    ecx             ; float

.text:4ECFCA10                 lea     eax, [ebp+var_F8]

.text:4ECFCA16                 fstp    [esp+108h+var_108]

.text:4ECFCA19                 push    eax             ; int

.text:4ECFCA1A                 mov     ecx, edi

.text:4ECFCA1C                 call    GpPath::Flatten(GpMatrix const *,float)

.text:4ECFCA21                 cmp     [ebp+var_2C], 0

 

Flattened GpPath object values:

0:000> dd poi(edi+34)

0e03cd18  449a7eab 458ac100 449a7eab 4e0000fd

0e03cd28  00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000

 

And after that our changed GpPath object is sent to calculateGradiantArray and some array of floating point values are made based on its calculation.

There are many other default floating point values has effects on the value of the overflowing size for GpMalloc that are not so interesting and I’ve just shown them on the diagram.

After the calculation integer wrapped, the heap allocated by the gpMalloc function is not big enough to hold our data. So in next uses of the wrapped allocated heap the corruption occurs. But it seems there is not a straight way of exploiting such heap corruptions using a standalone file. .

PoC link   : http://abysssec.com/files/GDI_PoC.zip

hello again to all of our great readers .

is this post we are going to do some clarification also share and drop some random 0day DEP/ASLR bypass using 3rd parties .

due to there is lots of things to say we wrote all the notes as an article called “The Arashi”.

 

Table of content :

===============================================================

Introduction and warning

The Story of Sayonara

First Method: ASLR Bitter

Second Method: Process Explorer

Narly Windbg Extension

Mona / PVEFindAddr

Ropping this fun DLL

First 0day tatsumaki

Second (half) 0day Ikazuchi

Third 0day Sugokunai

Final Note

===============================================================

and finally  here you can download it from  : here

note that the offer in paper will be expire in 10 day so if you are verified and need one of modules let us know .

as always feel free to contact us : info [at] abysssec.com

and also follow @abysssec in twitter

 

Hello again . as a lot of readers like windows 7 exploits here is other one .

1) Advisory information

Title                   : Adobe Flash player Action script type confusion   Version             :  flash10h.dll Discovery         :  Malware writers Exploit              :  abysssec.com Vendor             :  http://www.adobe.com Impact              :  Critical Contact            :   info  [at] abysssec.com Twitter            : @abysssec CVE                    : CVE-2010-3654

2) Vulnerable version

Adobe Flash Player 10.1.53 .64 prior versions

3) Vulnerability information

 

Class  1- Type Confusion Impact Successfully exploiting this issue allows remote attackers to execute code under the context of targeted browser. Remotely Exploitable Yes Locally Exploitable Yes

4) Vulnerability detail

Here we have type confusion vulnerability in ActionScript bytecode language. The cause of these vulnerabilities is because of implementation of verification process in AS3 jit engine that because of some miscalculation in verifying datatype atoms, some data replaces another type of data and the confusion results in faulty machine code.

Action script has the following structure. First our scripts are compiled using an action script compiler like flex to AS3 ByteCodes and embed it to DoABC, DoAction or DoInitAction tags in swf file format. When flash player opens the swf file, bytecodes are compiled to a jitted machine code through verification and generation process. Verification process is responsible for checking bytecodes to be valid instructions and it pass the valid bytecodes to generation process, thus generation process produces the machine code in memory.

According to Dion Blazakis’s JIT Spray paper:

 

To handle this runtime typing requirement, the ActionScript interpreter represents internal objects using tagged pointers – internal, this object is called an “atom”. Tagged pointers are a common implementation technique to differentiate between those objects stored by value and those stored by reference using the same word sized memory cell. A tagged pointer stores type information in the least significant bits and stores a type specific values in the most significant bits. As shown in Illustration 1, the ActionScript atom is 32 bits wide; it allocates 3 bits to store the type information and uses 29 bits for the value.

So if it would be possible to confuse verifier too act an atom as another atom by some bytecode changes it would be possible to generate faulty code that most of the times lead to disclosing a vtable pointer call to the attacker.

The bug is perfectly presented in Haifei li recent slides. We have OriginalClass and RefClass with the same functions. Func1 – OriginalClass return a class objects, but Func1 – RefClass returns another type. By changing a byte in the bytecode we have confused AS3 to execute RefClass functions in the main class. After that verifier confuses the return type of the function with an OriginalClass object and generate faulty code with the vtable under the control of the return value.

 

Exploitation:

For exploitation purpose on recent protections on windows 7 without any 3^rd party, it is possible to use the same bug many times to leak the imageBase address and payload address. In our exploit we used three confusion to read String Objects address and accordingly imagebase address.

Step1: read shellcode string object pointer by confusing it with uint and use it to leak ImageBase.

Step2: leak address of the shellcode with the same pointer and NewNumber trick.

Step3: send imageBase & shellcode address as parameters to the RopPayload function, develop Rop payload string and again confuse the return value with uint to read address of RopPayload string.

Step4: send address of the rop payload as parameters to the last confused function that confuses string type with class object. And thus address of our rop payload will be used as vtable in the fake class object.

Note: In using strings as a buffer for shellcode in action script, it is important to use alphanumeric characters because the toString method converts our ascii character set to uincode thus make our shellcode unusable.

5) Conclusion

Finally we got the point that memory leakages are extremely useful in modern exploitation to bypass DEP, ASLR protections. It would be possible to find same atom confusion situation and other object leakage in adobe flash player. Kudos to haifei li for his great research, although it was not that simple to implement a reliable exploit with just slides without attending in talk.

6) Refrences

http://www.cansecwest.com/csw11/Flash_ActionScript.ppt

http://www.semantiscope.com/research/BHDC2010/BHDC-2010-Paper.pdf

7) Exploit-Code

Here you can get our reliable exploit against windows 7 :

calc.exe payload

Download : CVE-2010-3654_Win7

if you need other payloads for sure you know how to change it ;)

as always feedbacks are welcomed and you can follow @abysssec in twitter to getting updates .

Happy Hunting !

Hello to all readers.

we know that there are thousands and millions of online game players around and we guess lots of them may like to cheat this is our totally offensive research that we did to present in immunity infiltrate and as we missed that so here we go .

 

This research is about hacking /exploiting / cheating in online games and is sponsored by immunity.

 

This is a six part talk and contains:

 

Part I   : introduction

Part II: Hacking Online Game Servers

Part III: Exploiting Online Games

Part IV: Cheating in Online games

Part V   : Creating your own cheats

Part VI: Bypassing anti-cheat engines

 

Real world cheating is mainly focused on in this talk as it’s fun and legal.
During this talk we will have a tour into all the ways to manipulate an online game
and we will end up with bypassing the latest anti-cheating technologies and
manipulating the game to our heart’s desire.

 

Our case studies are:

 

1 -counter strike (half-life) as game:

 

2- SXE-Injected and Valve-anti cheat (VAC) as anti-cheat engines

Our codes will be release soon as soon we can but if you are hurry to use some cheats you can find almost all necessary codes in slides also there is two demos for proofing our research. We really enjoyed this research and it’s done from our side hope you enjoy too.

 

You can download slides here:

ppt : Exploiting-Online-Games

Font : in case if you have problem with embedded one

PDF : Exploiting-Online-Games

PS 1 : video demos are ready but due to those are huge we need to find a better way to compress them after that we will post them here.

PS 2 : Tools will be release after a while .

For getting updates about tools / videos please follow @abysssec in twitter.

 

For any question please contact:

 

Shahin [at] abysssec.com

 

For any other requirement please contact:

 

Info [at] abysssec.com

 

Kind Regards

1) Advisory information

Title                   :  Adobe Shockwave player rcsL chunk memory corruption Version             : Shockwave player 11.5.8.612 Discovery         :  http://abysssec.com Vendor             :  http://www.adobe.com Impact              :  Critical Contact            :  shahin [at] abysssec.com , info  [at] abysssec.com Twitter             : @abysssec CVE                   :  ZeroDay Not Patched

2) Vulnerable version

Shockwave Player 11.5.8.612 last version

3) Vulnerability information

Class 1- Memory corruption allow command execute Impact Successfully exploiting this issue allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause denial-of-service conditions. Remotely Exploitable Yes Locally Exploitable Yes

4) Vulnerabilities detail

Introduction

Shockwave player is a plug in for loading Adobe Director video files in to the browser. Director movies have DIR or compressed format of DCR.  DIR file format is based on RIFF based formats. RIFF formats start with a 4byte RIFX identifier and length of the file. And subsequently chunks come together with format of 4byte chunk identifier + size of chunk + data. Some of the chunk identifiers are tSAC, pami, rcsL.

By help of our simple fuzzer we have manipulated a director movie file and found a vulnerability in part of an existing rcsL chunk.

Vulnerability explanation

There is a 4bytes value in the undocumented rcsL chunk in our sample director movie and it may be possible to find similar rcsL chunks in other director samples. The 4bytes so called value can be manipulated to reach the vulnerable part of function 68122990. Here is the function:

.text:68122990 sub_68122990    proc near               ; CODE XREF: sub_68112120+1A57p .text:68122990                                         ; DATA XREF: sub_68122F30+4AAo .text:68122990 .text:68122990 var_8           = dword ptr -8 .text:68122990 var_4           = dword ptr -4 .text:68122990 arg_0           = dword ptr  4 .text:68122990 arg_4           = dword ptr  8 .text:68122990 .text:68122990                 sub     esp, 8 .text:68122993                 mov     eax, [esp+8+arg_4] .text:68122997                 push    ebx .text:68122998                 push    ebp .text:68122999                 push    esi .text:6812299A                 mov     esi, [esp+14h+arg_0] .text:6812299E                 push    edi .text:6812299F                 push    eax .text:681229A0                 push    esi .text:681229A1                 call    sub_680FC6D0 .text:681229A6                 mov     ecx, [esi+18h] .text:681229A9                 mov     edx, [esi+10h] .text:681229AC                 mov     ebp, [esi+1Ch] .text:681229AF                 mov     ebx, [esi+20h] .text:681229B2                 add     ecx, 0FFFFFFF8h .text:681229B5                 cmp     ebp, 3 .text:681229B8                 mov     [esp+18h+arg_0], eax .text:681229BC                 mov     [esi+18h], ecx .text:681229BF                 mov     eax, [edx] .text:681229C1                 mov     edx, [eax+ecx] .text:681229C4                 lea     edi, [esi+1Ch] .text:681229C7                 mov     [edi], edx .text:681229C9                 mov     eax, [eax+ecx+4] .text:681229CD                 mov     [edi+4], eax .text:681229D0                 mov     [esp+18h+var_8], 4 .text:681229D8                 mov     [esp+18h+var_4], 0 .text:681229E0                 jz      short loc_681229F6 .text:681229E2                 push    ebx .text:681229E3                 push    ebp .text:681229E4                 push    0Ch .text:681229E6                 push    esi .text:681229E7                 call    sub_680FCFB0 .text:681229EC                 pop     edi .text:681229ED                 pop     esi .text:681229EE                 pop     ebp .text:681229EF                 pop     ebx .text:681229F0                 add     esp, 8 .text:681229F3                 retn    8 .text:681229F6 ; ————————————————————————— .text:681229F6 .text:681229F6 loc_681229F6:                           ; CODE XREF: sub_68122990+50j .text:681229F6                 mov     ecx, [ebx] .text:681229F8                 mov     edx, [ecx] .text:681229FA                 mov     ecx, [esp+18h+arg_0] .text:681229FE                 lea     eax, [esp+18h+var_8] .text:68122A02                 push    eax .text:68122A03                 push    ecx .text:68122A04                 push    ebx .text:68122A05                 push    esi .text:68122A06                 call    dword ptr [edx+2Ch] .text:68122A09                 mov     ecx, [esi+7Ch] .text:68122A0C                 test    ecx, ecx .text:68122A0E                 jz      short loc_68122A22 .text:68122A10                 push    ebx .text:68122A11                 push    ebp .text:68122A12                 push    esi .text:68122A13                 call    sub_680FC730 .text:68122A18                 pop     edi .text:68122A19                 pop     esi .text:68122A1A                 pop     ebp .text:68122A1B                 pop     ebx .text:68122A1C                 add     esp, 8 .text:68122A1F                 retn    8 .text:68122A22 ; ————————————————————————— .text:68122A22 .text:68122A22 loc_68122A22:                           ; CODE XREF: sub_68122990+7Ej .text:68122A22                 test    eax, eax .text:68122A24                 jnz     loc_68122AAC .text:68122A2A                 push    esi .text:68122A2B                 call    sub_680FD9D0 .text:68122A30                 push    edi .text:68122A31                 push    esi .text:68122A32                 mov     [edi], ebp .text:68122A34                 mov     [edi+4], ebx .text:68122A37                 call    sub_680FC7C0 .text:68122A3C                 push    esi .text:68122A3D                 call    sub_680FD9D0 .text:68122A42                 mov     eax, [esp+18h+arg_4] .text:68122A46                 mov     edx, [esi+28h] .text:68122A49                 mov     [esi+0A4h], eax .text:68122A4F                 mov     dword ptr [esi+20h], 80000001h .text:68122A56                 mov     ecx, [edx] .text:68122A58                 lea     eax, [eax+eax*2] .text:68122A5B                 push    esi .text:68122A5C                 call    dword ptr [ecx+eax*8+20h] .text:68122A60                 mov     eax, [esi+7Ch] .text:68122A63                 test    eax, eax .text:68122A65                 jz      short loc_68122A85 .text:68122A67                 cmp     eax, 4 .text:68122A6A                 jnz     short loc_68122ACE .text:68122A6C                 mov     edx, [esp+18h+arg_0] .text:68122A70                 push    edx .text:68122A71                 push    8 .text:68122A73                 push    37h .text:68122A75                 push    esi .text:68122A76                 call    sub_680FD040 .text:68122A7B                 pop     edi .text:68122A7C                 pop     esi .text:68122A7D                 pop     ebp .text:68122A7E                 pop     ebx .text:68122A7F                 add     esp, 8 .text:68122A82                 retn    8 .text:68122A85 ; ————————————————————————— .text:68122A85 .text:68122A85 loc_68122A85:                           ; CODE XREF: sub_68122990+D5j .text:68122A85                 mov     eax, [edi] .text:68122A87                 mov     ecx, [edi+4] .text:68122A8A                 mov     edx, [esi+10h] .text:68122A8D                 mov     [esp+18h+var_8], eax .text:68122A91                 mov     eax, [esi+18h] .text:68122A94                 add     eax, 0FFFFFFF8h .text:68122A97                 mov     [esp+18h+var_4], ecx .text:68122A9B                 mov     [esi+18h], eax .text:68122A9E                 mov     ecx, [edx] .text:68122AA0                 mov     edx, [ecx+eax] .text:68122AA3                 mov     [edi], edx .text:68122AA5                 mov     eax, [ecx+eax+4] .text:68122AA9                 mov     [edi+4], eax .text:68122AAC .text:68122AAC loc_68122AAC:                           ; CODE XREF: sub_68122990+94j .text:68122AAC                 push    ebx .text:68122AAD                 push    ebp .text:68122AAE                 push    esi .text:68122AAF                 call    sub_680FC730 .text:68122AB4                 mov     eax, [esi+7Ch] .text:68122AB7                 test    eax, eax .text:68122AB9                 jnz     short loc_68122ACE .text:68122ABB                 push    esi .text:68122ABC                 call    sub_680FD9D0 .text:68122AC1                 mov     ecx, [esp+18h+var_8] .text:68122AC5                 mov     edx, [esp+18h+var_4] .text:68122AC9                 mov     [edi], ecx .text:68122ACB                 mov     [edi+4], edx .text:68122ACE .text:68122ACE loc_68122ACE:                           ; CODE XREF: sub_68122990+DAj .text:68122ACE                                         ; sub_68122990+129j .text:68122ACE                 pop     edi .text:68122ACF                 pop     esi .text:68122AD0                 pop     ebp .text:68122AD1                 pop     ebx .text:68122AD2                 add     esp, 8 .text:68122AD5                 retn    8 .text:68122AD5 sub_68122990    endp

In the above function we have direct control on the second argument of the function. By manipulating the argument in rcsL chunk we reach to an indirect call that is based on our arguments:

.text:68122A42                 mov     eax, [esp+18h+arg_4] .text:68122A46                 mov     edx, [esi+28h] .text:68122A49                 mov     [esi+0A4h], eax .text:68122A4F                 mov     dword ptr [esi+20h], 80000001h .text:68122A56                 mov     ecx, [edx] .text:68122A58                 lea     eax, [eax+eax*2] .text:68122A5B                 push    esi .text:68122A5C                 call    dword ptr [ecx+eax*8+20h]

The above code is our vulnerable part. EAX register is set with second argument that we have control on it and ESI is first argument of the function and is a pointer to a dynamic allocated structure in heap. Value of offset 28h of the structure that is unknown is set in ECX register and finally an indirect call to the ‘ECX+EAX*24+20h’ is done. Because result of EAX*24 is a large value and we have complete control on EAX register we can almost control first byte of our indirect call pointer without the need of ECX register.

Exploitation :

For exploitation purpose because we don’t have a fixed address in our call we cannot control the execution flow to an exact value but we can jump to a specific range because we have control on first bytes of the pointer of indirect call. So here by abusing javascript we can use old-school heap spray technic to fill memory with nops+shellcode and call to this range.

To control the 4 bytes EAX register in our exploit we manipulated 4bytes at offset 4C4B of the file to value FFF00267.

An important hint here is that because we call the indirect pointer the EIP is set to nops itself. As you know an EIP of 90909090 is invalid. But we can use other opcodes as nopslides that doesn’t have any effect. In our test sample we used 0a0a0a0a as both base range of heap spray and nopslides because 0a0a opcode is an OR instruction on some unimportant registers.

The sample + exploit are tested on patched windows XP service pack 3.

here is exploit + binary analysis link:

http://abysssec.com/files/Adobe_Shockwave_Director_rcsL_Chunk_Memory_Corruption.zip

Proof Video : Here

PS 1 : this vulnerability is not patched bug released by ZDI http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-10-162/

PS 2 : it’s possible to exploit this vulnerability on modern windows like Vista/7 too and it’s up to readers …

related links:

http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2010/2752

http://secunia.com/advisories/41932

CVE-2010-3653

http://www.adobe.com/products/player_census/shockwaveplayer/

http://www.adobe.com/support/security/advisories/apsa10-04.html

Happy Hacking !

Yes ! finally MOAUB (Month of Abysssec Undisclosed Bugs) started and finished as well.

Good Or Bad we released lots of 0days and binary analyses during a month (September) and you can use these info for owning websites UN-patched clients  or writing more secure applications .

here is summary:

Day1:

Binary Analysis:

MOAUB #1 – Adobe Acrobat Reader and Flash Player “newclass” invalid pointer

MOAUB #1 – Adobe Acrobat Reader and Flash Player “newclass” invalid pointer – Binary Analysis

0day:

MOAUB #1 – Cpanel PHP Restriction Bypass Vulnerability 0day

MOAUB #1 – Cpanel PHP Restriction Bypass Vulnerability 0day

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Day2:

Binary Analysis:

MOAUB #2 – Apple QuickTime FlashPix NumberOfTiles Remote Code Execution Vulnerability

MOAUB #2 – Apple QuickTime FlashPix NumberOfTiles Vulnerability – Binary Analysis

0day:

MOAUB #2 – Rainbowportal Multiple Remote Vulnerabilities

MOAUB #2 – Rainbowportal Multiple Remote Vulnerabilities – 0day

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Day3:

Binary Analysis:

MOAUB #3 – Trend Micro Internet Security Pro 2010 ActiveX extSetOwner Remote Code Execution

MOAUB #3 – Trend Micro Internet Security Pro 2010 ActiveX extSetOwner – Binary Analysis

0day:

MOAUB #3 – Visinia 1.3 Multiple Vulnerabilities

MOAUB #3 – Visinia CMS Multiple Vulnerabilities – 0day

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Day4:

Binary Analysis:

MOAUB #4 – Movie Maker Remote Code Execution (MS10-016)

MOAUB #4 – Movie Maker Remote Code Execution (MS10-016) – Binary Analysis

0day:

MOAUB #4 – syndeocms 2.8.02 Multiple Vulnerabilities

MOAUB #4 – Syndeocms 2.8.02 Multiple Vulnerabilities – 0day

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Day5:

Binary Analysis:

MOAUB #5 – Microsoft MPEG Layer-3 Remote Command Execution Exploit

MOAUB #5 – Microsoft MPEG Layer-3 Remote Command Execution – Binary Analysis

0day:

MOAUB #5 – IfNuke Multiple Remote Vulnerabilities 0day

MOAUB #5 – IfNuke Multiple Remote Vulnerabilities 0day

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Day6:

Binary Analysis:

MOAUB #6 – HP OpenView NNM webappmon.exe execvp_nc Remote Code Execution

MOAUB #6 – HP OpenView NNM webappmon execvp_nc Remote Code Execution – Binary Analysis

0day:

MOAUB #6 – InterPhoto Gallery Multiple Remote Vulnerabilities

MOAUB #6 – InterPhoto Gallery Multiple Remote Vulnerabilities – 0day

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Day7:

Binary Analysis:

MOAUB #7 – Novell Netware NWFTPD RMD/RNFR/DELE Argument Parsing Buffer overflow

MOAUB #7 – Novell Netware NWFTPD RMD/RNFR/DELE Argument Parsing Buffer overflow

0day:

MOAUB #7 – DynPage <= v1.0 Multiple Remote Vulnerabilities – 0day

MOAUB #7 – DynPage <= v1.0 Multiple Remote Vulnerabilities – 0day

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Day8:

Binary Analysis:

MOAUB #8 – Microsoft Office Visio DXF File Stack based Overflow

MOAUB #8 – Microsoft Office Visio DXF File Stack based Overflow – Binary Analysis

0day:

MOAUB #8 – Sirang Web-Based D-Control Multiple Remote Vulnerabilities

MOAUB #8 – Sirang Web-Based D-Control Multiple Remote Vulnerabilities – 0 day

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Day9:

Binary Analysis:

MOAUB #9 – Mozilla Firefox XSLT Sort Remote Code Execution Vulnerability

MOAUB #9 – Mozilla Firefox XSLT Sort Remote Code Execution Vulnerability

0day:

FestOS CMS 2.3b Multiple Remote Vulnerabilities

MOAUB #9 – FestOS CMS 2.3b Multiple Remote Vulnerabilities

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Day10:

Binary Analysis:

MOAUB #10 – Excel RTD Memory Corruption

MOAUB #10 – Excel RTD Memory Corruption

0day:

MOAUB #10 – aradBlog Multiple Remote Vulnerabilities

MOAUB #10 – aradBlog Multiple Remote Vulnerabilities

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Day11:

Binary Analysis:

MOAUB #11 – Microsoft Office Word 2007 sprmCMajority Buffer Overflow

MOAUB #11 – Microsoft Office Word 2007 sprmCMajority Buffer Overflow

0day:

MOAUB #11 – ASP Nuke SQL Injection Vulnerability

MOAUB #11 – ASP Nuke Sql Injection Vulnerability

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Day12:

Binary Analysis:

MOAUB #12 – Adobe Acrobat and Reader “pushstring” Memory Corruption

MOAUB #12 – Adobe Acrobat and Reader “pushstring” Memory Corruption

0day:

MOAUB #12 – eshtery CMS SQL Injection Vulnerability

MOAUB #12 – eshtery CMS SQL Injection Vulnerability

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Day13:

Binary Analysis:

MOAUB #13 – RealPlayer FLV Parsing Integer Overflow

MOAUB #13 – RealPlayer FLV Parsing Integer Overflow

0day:

MOAUB #13 – Luftguitar CMS Vulnerability: Upload Arbitrary File

MOAUB #13 – Luftguitar CMS Vulnerability: Upload Arbitrary File

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Day14:

Binary Analysis:

MOAUB #14 – Novell iPrint Client Browser Plugin ExecuteRequest debug Parameter Stack Overflow

MOAUB #14 – Novell iPrint Client Browser Plugin ExecuteRequest debug Stack Overflow

0day:

MOAUB #14 – FreeDiscussionForums v1.0 Multiple Remote Vulnerabilities

MOAUB #14 – FreeDiscussionForums v1.0 Multiple Remote Vulnerabilities

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Day15:

Binary Analysis:

MOAUB #15 – Ipswitch Imail Server List Mailer Reply-To Address Memory Corruption

MOAUB #15 – Ipswitch Imail Server List Mailer Reply-To Address Memory Corruption

0day:

MOAUB #15 – PHP MicroCMS 1.0.1 Multiple Remote Vulnerabilities

MOAUB #15 – PHP MicroCMS 1.0.1 Multiple Remote Vulnerabilities

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Day16:

Binary Analysis:

MOAUB #16 – Microsoft Excel HFPicture Record Parsing Remote Code Execution Vulnerability

MOAUB #16 – Microsoft Excel HFPicture Record Parsing Remote Code Execution Vulnerability

0day:

MOAUB #16 – mojoportal Multiple Remote Vulnerabilities

MOAUB #16 – mojoportal Multiple Remote Vulnerabilities

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Day17:

Binary Analysis:

MOAUB #17 – Firefox Plugin Parameter EnsureCachedAttrParamArrays Remote Code Execution

MOAUB #17 – Firefox Plugin Parameter EnsureCachedAttrParamArrays Remote Code Execution

0day:

MOAUB #17 – phpmyfamily Multiple Remote Vulnerabilities

MOAUB #17 – phpmyfamily Multiple Remote Vulnerabilities

———————————————————————————–

Day18:

Binary Analysis:

MOAUB #18 – Apple QuickTime FLI LinePacket Remote Code Execution Vulnerability

MOAUB #18 – Apple QuickTime FLI LinePacket Remote Code Execution Vulnerability

0day:

MOAUB #18 – CMSimple XSRF Vulnerability

MOAUB #18- CMSimple XSRF Vulnerability

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Day19:

Binary Analysis:

MOAUB #19 – Novell iPrint Client Browser Plugin call-back-url Stack Overflow

MOAUB #19 – Novell iPrint Client Browser Plugin call-back-url Stack Overflow

0day:

MOAUB #19 – JMD-CMS Multiple Remote Vulnerabilities

MOAUB #19 – JMD-CMS Multiple Remote Vulnerabilities

———————————————————————————–

Day20:

Binary Analysis:

MOAUB #20 – Java CMM readMabCurveData Stack Overflow

MOAUB #20 – Java CMM readMabCurveData Stack Overflow

0day:

MOAUB #20 – VWD-CMS CSRF Vulnerability

MOAUB #20 – VWD-CMS CSRF Vulnerability

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Day21:

Binary Analysis:

MOAUB #21 – Microsoft Excel WOPT Record Parsing Heap Memory Corruption

MOAUB #21 – Microsoft Excel WOPT Record Parsing Heap Memory Corruption

0day:

MOAUB #21 – Personal.Net Portal Multiple Vulnerabilities

MOAUB #21 – Personal.Net Portal Multiple Vulnerabilities

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Day22:

Binary Analysis:

MOAUB #22 – Adobe Shockwave Director tSAC Chunk Memory Corruption

MOAUB #22 – Adobe Shockwave Director tSAC Chunk Memory Corruption

0day:

MOAUB #22 – gausCMS Multiple Vulnerabilities

MOAUB #22 – gausCMS Multiple Vulnerabilities

———————————————————————————–

Day23:

Binary Analysis:

MOAUB #23 – Adobe Acrobat Reader and Flash ‘newfunction’ Remote Code Execution Vulnerability

MOAUB #23 – Adobe Acrobat Reader and Flash ‘newfunction’ Remote Code Execution Vulnerability

0day:

MOAUB #23 – Microsoft Excel HFPicture Record Parsing Memory Corruption (0day)

MOAUB #23 – Microsoft Excel HFPicture Record Parsing Memory Corruption (0day)

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Day24:

Binary Analysis:

MOAUB #24 – Microsoft Excel OBJ Record Stack Overflow

MOAUB #24 – Microsoft Excel OBJ Record Stack Overflow

0day:

MOAUB #24 – Microsoft MPEG Layer-3 Audio Decoder Division By Zero

MOAUB #24 – Microsoft MPEG Layer-3 Audio Decoder Division By Zero

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Day25:

Binary Analysis:

MOAUB #25 – Mozilla Firefox CSS font-face Remote Code Execution Vulnerability

MOAUB #25 – Mozilla Firefox CSS font-face Remote Code Execution Vulnerability

0day:

MOAUB #25 – VisualSite CMS v1.3 Multiple Vulnerabilities

MOAUB #25 – VisualSite CMS v1.3 Multiple Vulnerabilities

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Day26:

Binary Analysis:

MOAUB #26 – Microsoft Cinepak Codec CVDecompress Heap Overflow

MOAUB #26 – Microsoft Cinepak Codec CVDecompress Heap Overflow

0day:

MOAUB #26 – Zenphoto Config Update and Command Execute Vulnerability

MOAUB #26 – Zenphoto Config Update and Command Execute Vulnerability

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Day27:

Binary Analysis:

MOAUB #27 – Microsoft Internet Explorer MSHTML Findtext Processing Issue

MOAUB #27 – Microsoft Internet Explorer MSHTML Findtext Processing Issue

0day:

MOAUB #27 – ndCMS Sql Injection Vulnerability

MOAUB #27 – ndCMS Sql Injection Vulnerability

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Day28:

0day:

MOAUB #28 – JE CMS 1.0.0 Bypass Authentication by SQL Injection Vulnerability

MOAUB #28 – JE CMS 1.0.0 Bypass Authentication by SQL Injection Vulnerability

0day:

MOAUB #28 – AtomatiCMS Upload Arbitrary File Vulnerability

MOAUB #28 – AtomatiCMS Upload Arbitrary File Vulnerability

———————————————————————————–

Day29:

Binary Analysis:

MOAUB #29 – Microsoft Excel SxView Record Parsing Heap Memory Corruption

MOAUB #29 – Microsoft Excel SxView Record Parsing Heap Memory Corruption

Day30:

Binary Analysis:

MOAUB #30 – Microsoft Unicode Scripts Processor Remote Code Execution

MOAUB #30 – Microsoft Unicode Scripts Processor Remote Code Execution

0day:

MOAUB #30 – ASPMass Shopping Cart Vulnerability File Upload CSRF

MOAUB #30 – ASPMass Shopping Cart Vulnerability File Upload CSRF

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Press :

PS : during these project and maybe we made some technical and non-technical mistakes due to complexly and compaction of this work and we hope we can fix some of them.

at end we are happy with result and your kind feedback.

for sure we will have really more interesting projects soon as soon possible and we think you will like them as well .

please follow me on twitter with @abysssec for other news projects and stay tunned for more projects .

as always finally if you have any question feel free to contact :

shahin [at] abysssec.com

info [at] abysssec.com

hello to all of our dear reades .

we are not dead , just really busy in doing our projects . but there is a few notes  I’d like to enclose with you  .first of all about 2 Web Based vulnerability we’ve report to milw0rm .  we haven’t free time to working on educational sources . and those vulnerability was special for us because those portal was commercial portals uses for our “government”  , “private” web sites. and we’ve report those for helping our autonomous applications .

by the way if you like to see those vulnerabilities here you are :

first DOURAN Portal <= 3.9.0.23 Multiple Remote Vulnerabilities

second Dana Portal Remote Change Admin Password Exploit

third about adobe exploit my next  writeup will be about PDF hacking / exploiting stuff (soon) .

and finally about future :

we believe to “no more free bugs” so after reporting a few more vulnerabilities / exploit maybe we don’t report more transparent / reliable exploit (as past) . maybe just PoC’s or just papers or just advisories titles or … . but who knows ?!

then :

we will try to update site with respectable index and more post on our blogs but you should take our apology for our late and unfaithfulness .

and final note :

unfortunately for a few reasons we disabled  commenting system on blogs but feel free to contact us with our mails.

for now you can use admin [at] abysssec.com .

keep on to visit us .

hope to see you soon .

hello to all readers

i wrote this exploit 2 hour after publishing PoC on milw0rm

but now there is a lots of mirror and version of this exploit on net !

maybe i release DEP-enabled / IE protection bypass version on variant os too .

Anyway Here is the code :

http://abysssec.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2009/02/ms09-002-exploit.txt

mirror : http://milw0rm.com/exploits/8079

Cheers !!!